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1 
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NATURE OF THE CASE 
Suit for alleged violation of Utah Uniform Land Sales 
Practices Act, 57-11-1, UCA, 1953, et seq. and for fraud. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Judge ~aylor dismissed fraud count without prejudice and 
awarded judgment for alleged violation of Land Sales Practices Act. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Dismissal_ of plaintiffs' abortive cross-appeal; determina-
tion that 10 acres involved in suit is not "subdivided lands" 
within the meaning of the Act; and/or that the transac~ion was an 
"exempt" transaction; reversing plaintiff's judgment; or that 
failing for a new trial on plaintiffs' claims under the Utah Act; 
and for a determination that dismissal of the fraud claim was 
with prejudice and/or is res judicata. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs admit that alleged fraud is not an issue in appeal. 
Defendants incorporate by reference the statement of facts 
contained in their original brief herein. Plaintiffs' statement 
of facts consists primarily of copying the Court's entire Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as their statement of facts (P. 3-9) 
with few citations to the record, which plaintiffs attempt to 
justify by acknowledging that the statement in defendants' brief 
(P. 3, , 1) to the effect that the alleged misrepresentations are 
unimportant (P. 7 of plaintiffs' brief) since the issue on appeal 
is whether or not the 10 acres involved in the transaction was 
"subdivided lands" or a "subdivision" within the meaning of the Act. 
Counsel for plaintiff then, summarily dismisses paragraphs #3 thru 
7 of defendants' statement of facts (P. 4 thru 8 of appellants brief Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to the effect that those paragraphs are "irrelevant," (P. 8). 
We agree that paragraphs 4fo3 thru 6 of defendants' statement 
of facts are immaterial (see statement in P. 4,1:4, , 4fa2 of original 
brief) since the question of alleged fraud is immaterial to the 
issues involved in the appeal as are paragraphs #4, 5, 6 and 12 
(pages 3 thru 6 of plaintiffs' brief [findings of fact]) and 
paragraph #3 of the conclusions (Page 8). 
2. Issue on a 
or were exempt 
eal is whether 10 acres was 
romAct. 
As stated in defendants' brief (P. 4, ~( 2) and plaintiffs' 
brief (P. 11), the primary controlling issue raised by defendants' 
appeal is whether the Iron County property conveyed to plaintiffs 
was an interest in "subdivided lands" or a "subdivision" as defined 
in the Act. This is so since defendants acknowledge that the 
10 acres was not registered, that no prospectus was delivered and 
no receipt was obtained (P. 3, , 1 of defendants' original brief); 
accordingly, if the 10 acres is a subdivision within the meaning 
of the Act, and is not exempt under the terms of the Act, plaintiff 
is entitled to recover. If the 10 acres is not a subdivision, or 
if the transaction was exempt, defendants are entitled to have the 
judgment vacated. 
3. Insufficiency of plaintiffs.' attempted cross-appeal. 
Plaintiffs' attempt as a part of their brief (P. 10, 19-21) 
to cross-appeal from Judge Leary's order granting a new trial 
after a prior trial in this matter (a copy of his order is 
attached as exhibit "C" to plaintiffs' brief). However, plain-
tiffs failed to file a docketing statement (Rule 73A(e), URCP); 
failed to file a bond for costs (Rule 73(c), URCP) within the 
times required by the rules or at all, thereby failing to perfect Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their ap~eal. See discussion on page 13, Point IV below. 
For the same reasons plaintiffs' attempt to cross-appeal from JudgE 
Taylor~~ s dismissal of their fraud claims (Point II) and attempt to 
cross-appeal to seek award of attorney fees on appeal (Point III) f 
to comply with the minimum requirements for a cross-appeal and shou 
be disregarded and dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE PARTIES DID NOT INVOLVE SUB-
DIVIDED LANDS WITHIN MEANING OF UTAH UNIFORM LAND SALES 
PRACTICES ACT AND/OR TRANSACTION WAS EXEMPT UNDER THE ACT 
4. Appeal· assumes facts in the light most favorable to judgment. 
Defendants incorporate by reference the argument found in 
pages 8 thru 18 of their original brief (Point I). In response 
to that argument counsel for defendants has quoted the Utah Act 
(P. 11) and has cited the general rule that the findings of the 
trial court will not be disturbed on appeal if they are based on 
"substantial, competent, admissible evidence" even though the 
appellate court might have arrived at a different conclusion had 
they been trying the case. We have no quarrel with that statement 
of the law. There is, however, no dispute as to relevant facts 
which would affect the result. All that is involved in the appeal i 
a determination by the Court as to whether tmder those undispu.ted.·· 
facts the land in question is "subdivision" land within the meaning 
of the Act (which we deny), or if so, whether the transaction was 
exempt under the Act. 
5. Summary of "facts" as claimed by plaintiffs. 
Defendants admit that the 10 acres was never "subdivided", 
and rely on the provisions of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953, which defines 
"subdivision" and "subdivided lands" as "any land which is divided 
- 6. -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
or proposed to be divided for the purpose of disposition into ten 
or more units, , " (P. 14 of plaintiffs' brief). If we cons-
true the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs' posi-
tion (most of which evidence is disputed by plaintiffs) we find 
that the plaintiffs claim the evidence establishes the following 
(in support of their claim that the 10 acres was proposed to be 
divided within the meaning of the Act): 
(a) That defendants allegedly delivered a subdivision map to 
plaintiffs (exhibit "D" to plaintiffs' brief - see P. 14 
of plaintiffs' brief). 
(b) That defendants allegedly pointed to certain lots on the 
map as the location of the 10 acres to be conveyed to 
plaintiffs and allegedly pointed out their proximity 
to other lots on the purported subdivision map. (P. 12 
of plaintiffs' brief). 
(c) That defendants allegedly "inferred" that the other lots 
shown on the map were being offered for "sale, exchange 
or other disposition." (P. 13 of plaintiffs' brief). 
(d) That defendants allegedly represented that there were to 
be certain improvements on the purported subdivision. 
(P. 14 of plaintiffs' brief). 
(e) That plaintiffs' 10 acres was conveyed by metes and bounds, 
and not by reference to lot numbers (Ex. 9-P - [Appendix 
V to defendants' original brief herein]). 
(f) That international Equities, Inc. (IEI) acquired a 300 acre 
tract in 1973; exchanged 5 acres of the tract for office 
furniture (R. 673); transferred 5 acres to a related 
corporation without consideration (R. 673, 678-680); 
and transferred some oil and gas rights (against without 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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consideration) to another related corporation (R. 679 1 
681); that no other dispositions from the 300 acres 
except for the exchange of the 10 acres to plaintiff 
were made during the 7 years between the purchase of 
the 300 acres and the trial date. (See P. 7-8 of orig-
inal brief by defendants herein). 
(g) That in 1973, shortly after acquisition of the 300 acres, 
IE! had investigated the feasibility of subdividing the 
property and selling recreational lots with dirt roads 
and without utilities (R. 781, 782, 820), but had aban-
doned the project about February, 1974, (R. 686, .782, 
790), cancelled its office lease, discharged its employ 
closed the. business office, sold its furniture and deci 
to hold the land for investment purposes (R. 790, 686, 
781-783). 
(h) That the proposed subdivision map (see par. #2, P. s~abov1 
was prepared in connection with the 1973 feasibility 
study (R. 683, 782, 806). 
As indicated above (par. 1fol), there are no issues of fraud or misrei 
resentation involved in this appeal. Our only concern is whether 01 
not the 10 acres conveyed to plaintiffs constitute land which was 
"proposed to be divided" within the meaning of 57-11-2(6), UCA, 
1953, (The Utah Act). 
6. Plaintiffs did not point to any evidence that the 10 acres was 
"proposed" to be "divided". 
Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence in the record whicl 
purports to establish that at the time the 10 acres was conveyed to 
- 6 -
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plaintiffs there was an intent to subdivide or "proposal" to sub-
divide any part of the 300 acres for disposition into 10 or more 
units. Without such evidence the transaction is not covered by the 
Act. The Court erred in allowing recovery under the Act. 
7. Actual "proposed" subdivision into 10 or more units required 
before Act applies. 
Considering the arguments of plaintiffs (paragraphs #1 thru 
7 above) as proven for purposes of testing the legal sufficiency of 
the evidence, still the facts are insufficient to establish that 
defendants "proposed" to divide the property into 10 or more units. 
Even if we were to assume that defendants misrepresented their intent 
to defendants with respect to subdividing the property (which we 
deny) the facts are still insufficient to permit recovery under the 
Act since the Act does not apply at all unless there is in fact an 
intent or "proposal" to subdivide into 10 or more units at the time 
of the transaction. Misrepresentation of intent might create a cause 
of action under some other theory, but does not create a cause of 
action under the Land Sales Practices Act, which requires an actual 
subdividing or an actual "proposed" subdivision into 10 or more units 
before the Act applies at all. See 57-11-2(6), UCA, 1953. (We deny 
that there was any misrepresentation. The Court dismissed plaintiffs' 
second claim which was based upon fraud - R. A7-9; R. A222, 234; 
R. A 254, ,5). 
8. Plaintiffs failed to prove that alleged "proposed" subdivision 
included 10 or more units. 
In addition to proving that defendants "proposed" to subdivide 
the land, plaintiffs had the burden of proving that that "proposed" 
subdivision would result in division into 10 or more units. The 
only evidence pointed to by plaintiffs is the subdivision map which 
had been prepared in connection with the abandoned investigation 
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into the feasibility of subdivision (commenced in 1973 and abandon 
in February, 1974, - see 'I 5 & 6, P. 5-6 above) and the fact that 
there had been three other transfers from the 300 acre tract, (on! 
one of which was for profit). See discussion on P. 14 of plaintif 
brief and P. 7, ~ 7 of defendants ' original brief. herein. Exchang1 I' 
of one parcel for furniture at a remote time does not tend to prov1 
an intent or "propos.al" to sub di vi de, not do the other two transfe1 
without consideration to related corporations (see , 5 (f), P. 5 abc 
9. Transfer of 10 acres to plaintiffs was an exempt "single" or 
"isolated" transaction. 
Plaintiffs next attempt to escape the appli.cation of the exemt 1D 
tions in the Act. Sec. 57-11-4(1) (a), UCA, 1953, exempts isolated ,. 
transactions dispositions by a "purchaser of subdivided lands for 
his own account in a single or isolated transaction." (See discussi ~ 
on P. 15 of plaintiffs' brief). Plaintiffs simply assert .that this 
exemption does not apply to a "subdivider or propoter of subdividedac 
lands," which statement begs the question. IE! purchased the 300 
acres in a single isolated transaction (finding of fact #7). Dis-
position of the 10 acres to plaintiffs was a single or isolated 
transaction which is remote in time and different in type from the .. 
furniture transaction (R. 673, Ex. 7-P). The other two transfers 
were not "for gain or profit" within the requirement of 57-11-2(2), .. 
UCA, 1953, [transfers to related corporations without consideration ~ 
see t 5, P. 5 above] and accordingly could not affect the "single o: ~ 
isolated transaction" nature of the transaction with plaintiffs. Tl 
transaction with plaintiffs is exempt. See discussion on page 18 
of defendants' original brief herein. 
10. Plaintiffs' 
for resa e was a 
- 8 -
acres to construct buildin s 
Act. 
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Plaintiffs argue (P. 16) that their acquisition of the 10 acres 
was not solely for purposes of constructing buildings thereon for 
resale, and accordingly that the exemption provided by 57-ll-4(c), 
UCA, 1953, does not apply. That statute does not use the term 
"solely". Plaintiffs argument is accordingly without merit. The 
transaction is exempt under that statute. See P. 18, , 18(d) of 
defendants' original brief herein. 
11. Refer to Point I of defendants' original brief. 
The Court is referred to defendants' original brief herein and 
in particular to Point I thereof. 
POINT II. PLAINTIFFS' ATTEMPT TO CROSS-APPEAL FROM DISMISSAL OF 
THEIR FRAUD CLAIM IS UNMERITORIOUS AND IS NOT BEFORE 
THE COURT. 
12. Judge Taylor properly dismissed plaintiffs' fraud claims. 
The trial Court dismissed the fraud count (second cause of 
action) as discussed in Point II of plaintiffs' brief and in Point 
II of defendants' brief (P. 18). The Court is referred to Point 
II of defendants' original brief. 
13. Plaintiffs improperly seek affirmative relief without a cross-
appeal. 
Although plaintiffs do not expressly so state under Point II, 
they are in essence cross-appealing from the decision of Judge Taylor 
dismissing their fraud claims and are asking that the Court, in the 
alternative, reverse Judge Taylor and find that they are entitled to 
recover on a fraud theory based upon a general statement (not refer-
enced to the record as required by Rule 75 (P)(2), URCP) that "the 
Court's findings sufficiently support a finding in fraud." Plaintiffs' 
argument in Point II is insufficient to permit this Court to reverse 
the decision of Judge Taylor, particularly where, as here, there has 
been no cross-appeal from Judge Taylor's judgment by plaintiffs. The Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only cross-appeal contained in the brief is from Judge Leary's orde 
granting a new trial (P. 10 of plaintiffs' brief). There is no 
. statement in their brief that plaintiffs cross-appeal from Judge 
Taylor's judgment. Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction 
to consider the argument raised by defendants in Point II. Even if 
the statements in Point II were to be construed as a cross-appeal 
(which it is not), the Court still lacks jurisdiction to entertain 
the cross-appeal and/or is required to dismiss the cross-appeal 
for failure of the plaintiffs to comply with the rules with respect 
to perfecting a cross-appeal. The same deficiencies exist with 
respect to a purported cross-appeal from Judge Taylor's dismissal o: 
the second cause of action as exists with respect to the abortive 
attempted cross-appeal from the order of Judge Leary which granted: 
new trial (see discussion in Point IV, P. 13 below), including 
plaintiffs' (1) failure to file a docketing statement as required 
by Rule 73 A URCP [see discussion under Point IV, P. 13 below]; 
(2) failure to file a statement of points as required by Rule 74(b), 
URCP [see discussion under Point IV, P. 13 below]; (3) failure to 
file a bond for costs on appeal as required by Rule 73(c), URCP, 
[see discussion under Point IV, P. 15 below]. 
14. Plaintiffs cannot 
rights or iminish the 
to enlar e thej 
cross-appealing_. 
Plaintiffs could, without filing a cross-appeal, defend their 
judgment on any ground consistent with the record, but cannot, howe' 
attack Judge Taylor's judgment, dismissing their fraud claim, so as 
either to enlarge their own rights thereunder or to lessen the right 
of the defendants, without filing a cross-appeal. Utah Ass 'n of Cre 
Men v. Board of Education, 54 U. 135, 197 P. 975; Appellate Advoc,!£ 
Handbook for the Utah Supreme Court, P. 29, footnote #1 and cases Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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there cited. Since plaintiffs failed to perfect a cross-appeal 
from the judgment of Judge Taylor dismissing their fraud claim that 
matter is not before the Court and plaintiffs' arguments in Points 
II (fraud claim), III (attorney fees) and IV (Judge Leary's order 
granting a new trial) should be disregarded and denied since they 
are not properly before the Court. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES IN 
CONNECTION WITH THIS APPEAL. 
15. Award of attorney fees for appeal is. appropriate in certain 
instances. 
Plaintiffs rely on Management Services Corp. v. Development 
Associates, 617 P. 2d 406, in their argument that they are entitled 
to recover attorney fees in connection with their appeal. Their 
argument would be sound if we were dealing with a contractural pro-
vision such as was involved in that case where the contract provision 
for payment of reasonable attorney's fees by the defaulting party 
included fees incurred in enforcing the agreement or in: 
"pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by 
the statutes of the State of Utah whether such 
remedy is pursued by filing a suit or otherwise." 
The Court properly held that the language of the contract was broad 
enough to include payment of attorney fees on appeal. 
16. This Court should exercise its .discretion and deny attorney 
fees to both parties for this appeal. 
The Utah Act (57-ll-17(c)(2), UCA, 1953) simply provides for 
recovery of "reasonable attorneys' fees." Nothing is said in the 
statute about attorney fees on appeal. Since there are bani-fide 
issues in this appea.l., since the plaintiffs have filed several abor-
tive attempted cross-appeals, in their brief which have required a 
response by the defendants, and since the appeal did not result 
from a "patently ·erroneous order" as was the situation in Bates v. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Techn logy Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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Bates, 560 P. 2d 706, the Court should exercise its discretion to 
deny attorney fees to plaintiffs. 
The matter of awarding attorney fees in connection with this appeal 
is not properly before the Court and the request should be denied 
for that reason, in addition to exercise of discretion as mentioned 
on page #11 above by reason of the cross-appeal by plaintiffs. 
17. Request for award of attorney fees is abortive attempted cross 
appeal. 
Plaintiffs' request in their Point III for an order awarding : 
attorney fees to them in connection with the appeal is an attempted: 
cross-appeal since the effect is to seek to enlarge the rights of 
plaintiffs and to diminish the rights of defendants. See paragraph~ 
4114 above and discuss.ion, argument and citations to Utah cases unde 
point IV, Page 15 below. Before plaintiffs could properly seek the: 
relief requested under Point III (award of attorney fees on appeal) 
it would be necessary for them to perfect a cross-appeal to clothe 
the Supreme Court with power to adjudicate the attorney fee issue. : 
This they have not done. Plaintiffs have failed to file or to per- :· 
feet a cross-appeal by reason of failure to (1) file. a cross-appeal 
in the manner required by Rule 47(b), URCP: (2) failure to file a 
docketing statement as required by Rule 73A, URP [see discussion 
under Point IV, P. 13. below]; (3) failure to file a statement of 
points as required by Rule 74(b), URCP [see discussion under Point 
IV, P. 13 below]; (4) failure to file a bond for costs on appeal 
as required by Rule 73(c), URCP [see discussion under Point IV, 
P. 15 below]. See also discussion under Point II, par. #14 above. 
- 12 -
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POINT IV. PLAINTIFFS' ABORTIVE CROSS-APPEAL IS IMPROPER AND 
SHOULD BE DISMISSED. 
18. Plaintiffs failed to follow required procedure for a cross-
appeal. 
Plaintiffs attempt as a part of their reply brief to file a 
"cross-appeal" from the order of Judge Leary granting a new trial 
(R Al84 - Exhibit "C" to plaintiffs' brief) by a simple statem~mt 
in their brief (P. 10) to the effect that they "cross-appeal from 
the Court's Order Granting a New Trial," followed py a short state-
ment of reasons (in conclusionary form on P. 10) and a brief argument 
as a part of point IV (P. 19'-21). 
19. Procedural steps required for a cross-appeal. 
Plaintiffs' attempt to cross-appeal is ineffective for the 
following reasons: 
(a) Plaintiffs failed to file a docketing statement concerning 
the points intended to be raised by their cross-appeal within the 
time required by Rule 73A, URCP, or at all. Rule 73A(e), URCP, 
reads in part as follows: 
"Failure to comply (with rule requl.n.r..g filing of 
docketing statement) may result in dismissal of the 
appeal ... " (emphasis added) 
(b) Plaintiffs failed to file a statement of points within 
the time required by Rule 74(b), URCP, or at all. Rule 74(b), URCP, 
reads in part as follows: 
"CROSS APPEALS. Where any one or more parties have 
filed a notice of appeal . . . other parties may . . 
cross appeal ... without filing a notice of appeal; 
provided, however, such party ... shall file a 
statement of the points on which he intends to rely 
on such cross appeal within the time re~uired and as 
required by subdivision (d) of Rule 75. (emphasis 
added) 
Rule 75(d), URCP, (referred to above) reads in part as follows: 
"STATEMENT OF POINTS. No assignment of errors is 
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20. Attem 
procedura 
necessary. If the appellant does not designate fot 
inclusion the complete record and all the proceedir 
and evidence in the action, he shall serve with his 
designation a concise statement of the Roints on 
which he ititends to rely on the appeal. 
If the respondent desires to cross-a¥peal, ... 
the re.s ondent shall, within 10 da s a ter the serv 
ing an iling of appe ant s designation, . . . 
1 
serve and file a statement of respondent 1 s points 
either by way of such cross-appeal or for the pur~ 
pose of having considered other or additional matte· 
than those raised by appellant." (emphasis added) : 
cross-a eal is a nullit for failure to com 1 with 
Under the above-quoted rules it is mandatory that a party 
seeking to cross-appeal file a statement of points upon which he 
intends to rely in the cross-appeal, which designation must be file 
within 10 days after the appellant has filed his designation of 
record on appeal as required by Rule 74, URCP. Since the designatir 
of record on appeal is due within 10 days after filing of the noticr 
of appeal, the statement of points to be relied upon in the proposei 
cross-appeal must be filed within 20 days after the filing of the 
appeal. See Rules 7 5 (a) and ( d) , URCP. The above-quoted rule uses .. 
the word "shall" in designating the time within which that designat: ~ 
of points must be filed, thereby making such filing mandatory. Hav· 
ing failed to comply with the requirements of the rules to perfect ~; 
an appeal the abortive attempted cross-appeal contained in plaintif: .: 
brief should be disregarded and dismissed. Under former law the 
service of a notice of cross-appeal and assignment of errors in sup·~ 
port thereof was jurisdictional and had to be done on a timely basi! .: 
to clothe the Court with jurisdiction to consider the appeal. See 
Christiansen v. Los Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 77 U. 85, 291 P. 926; 
Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities Co., 78 U. 39, 300 P. 1040. 
There is no logical reason why the same rule should not apply to 
1 /. 
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attempted cross-appeals under Rule 74(b), URCP, where the litigant 
has failed, as in our case, to comply with the time and procedural 
requirements of that rule for perfecting a cross-appeal. 
(c) Plaintiffs failed to file a bond for costs on appeal as 
required by Rule 73(c), URCP. In Buttrey v. Guaranteed Securities 
Co., 78 U. 39, 300 P. 1040 the Utah Supreme Court stated in part 
as follows (at page 1043 of P.): 
"It is claimed . . . that no undertaking is required of 
him because his is a cross-appeal, and the statutes do 
not apply to such appeals. But the statutes make no 
exceptions in favor of cross-appeals; by the plain import 
of their terms they apply to all appeals . . . . But what-
ever name may be given to them, they are still appeals, 
and nothing else so far as the statutes are concerned." 
(emphasis added). 
The Buttrey, supra, case has not been overruled, and was cited as 
authority in the Appellate Advocacy Handbook for the Utah Supreme 
Court, P. 29. In the Buttry, supra, case the attempted cross-
appeal was dismissed for failure to file an undertaking for costs. 
See also Johnston v. Geary, 33 P. 2d 757, 84 U. 47. 
21. The Court lacks jurisdiction to consider the attempted cross-
appeal. 
Having failed to perfect their cross-appeal in the manner re-
quired by law the plaintiffs canno.t now request the relief asserted 
in Point IV of their brief (P. 19-21) [asking that the order of Judge 
Leary granting a new trial be reversed and. his original judgment be 
reinstated]. The Court is without jurisdiction to grant that re-
lief since there has been no valid appeal filed from that order. 
(See discussion in par. 1/:19 and 20 above). A litigant may not 
attack the judgment, either to enlarge his own rights thereunder or 
to lessen the rights of his adversary, unless he files and perfects 
a valid cross-appeal, which plaintiffs have failed to do. See San 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Pedro L.A. & S.L.R. Co. v. Board of Education, 35 U. 13, 99 P. 26:: 
McCornick & Co. v. National Copper Bank, 49 U. 296, 163 P. 1097; 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Shurtliff, 49 U. 569, 164 P. 851: 
Utah Ass'n of Credit Men v. Board of Education, 54 U. 135, 179 P. 
The foregoing cases were also all cited as current authority for 
this proposition in the AEpellate Advocacy Handbook for the Utah 
Supreme Court, P. 29. 
POINT V. THE UTAH UNIFORM LAND SALES PRACTICE ACT SHOULD NOT BE 
EXPANDED TO INCLUDE SALES OF RAW LAND WHICH IS NOT THEN 
"PROPOSED TO BE DIVIDED," TO AVOID UNNECESSARY RES-
TRAINT ON THE SALE OF RAW LAND IN UTAH. 
The construction placed on the Utah Land Sales Practice Act 
by the District Court would cause an undue restraint on sale of 
undeveloped land in Utah since any buyer of undeveloped land could 
then claim that his isolated transaction was within the scope of th· 
Act. Application of the Act should be limited to the terms and 
purpose should be limited to situations where there is an actual 
subdivision or an actual proposal to subdivide into 10 or more unit:~ 
Utah land transactions should not be encumbered by the restrictive 
provisions of the Act until sufficient acts have been done toward 
subdividing so that it is clear that a subdivision is in fact 
"proposed" within the meaning of the act. Usual claims for breach 
of contract, fraud, etc. are sufficient to redress appropriate 
claims involving undeveloped land without injecting the specter of 
a suit under the Utah Act into every sale of undeveloped land. The 
interests of the public ~-:ill be adequately protected by a more res-
trictive construction of the statute, without undue burden on land 
transactions. In Bartholomew v. Northampton Natl. Bank, et al., 
584 F2d 1288 (third Cir. 1978) the Court rejected a claim that the 
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Land Sales Act, 15 USCS § 1701, et seq. The tendency h~s been to 
limit the scope of similar statutes to the sale of subdivisions, 
not to expend them to isolated sales of raw ground. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated in defendants' original brief herein, the 
defendants did not "divide'·' or "propose to divide" their 300 
acre tract into 10 or more units at the time of conveyance of 
of 10 acres to plaintiffs and accordingly the Utah Land Sales 
Practice Act under which the Court awarded judgment is not appli-
cable and the judgment should be reversed. Further, the trans-
action was exempt as a "single or isolated transaction" and by 
reason of plaintiffs' acquisition of the 10 acres for purposes 
of constructing buildings thereon for resale, and under other 
exemptions discussed herein. The requests by plaintiffs for af-
firmative relief from the Supreme Court without perfecting cross-
appeals (Points II, III and IV) must be denied since those claims 
are not properly before the Court and the Court is accordingly 
without jurisdiction to grant such relief. 
The judgment under the Utah Land Sales Practices Act should 
be reversed. 
Dated the 2nd day of February, 1981. 
onald C. Barker, attorney for defen-
dants, 2870 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84115. 
I hereby certify that I caused a copy of the foregoing reply 
brief to be mailed to Wayne G. Petty, 600 Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, the 3rd day of February, 1981. 
~C-~=-
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